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ABSTRACT 
 This research uses a case study approach to analyze the respective naval 
acquisition processes of the United States and Taiwan. The methodology enables a 
comparison of the acquisition systems used by the U.S. Navy (USN) and Republic of 
China Navy (ROCN) related to specific naval acquisition programs. The researcher 
identifies that both countries have established similar structures in their respective 
acquisition systems; however, the U.S. acquisition system is more comprehensive and 
systematic than Taiwan’s system. As for the implementation of the respective systems, 
the U.S. Navy made several mistakes by adopting an experimental acquisition strategy in 
the process of its Littoral Combat Ship program. By contrast, Taiwan adopted a more 
conventional approach for the Tuo Chiang-class corvette program, hence mitigating risk. 
Recommendations for the United States are to conduct sufficient analysis before taking 
experimental approaches and to value the importance of requirement identification and 
test and evaluation. In contrast, Taiwan needs to complete its acquisition regulations to 
cover the process of a program’s full life cycle and organize these steps in a systematic 
manner. Moreover, the test and evaluation processes should not be ignored to expedite 
the progress of a program. Finally, Taiwan also needs to develop strategic guidance that 
directs requirements identification beyond the next decade. 
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Taiwan has been facing fast-growing military threats from Mainland China since 
the civil war in the 1940s. As a result of pressure from China, Taiwan is not recognized by 
most of the countries in the world, which makes it difficult for Taiwan to acquire its 
armaments from most countries, despite being a U.S. ally in the West Pacific against China. 
All of Taiwan’s weapon acquisition programs came through either indigenous 
development or procurement from the United States or France, only when political 
conditions allowed. Examining the efficiency of the system is crucial as Taiwan considers 
its limited options and the growing threat it confronts from the People’s Liberation Army. 
By analyzing and comparing the acquisition system of the United States and Taiwan, the 
pros and cons of each system can be identified and recommendations for further 
improvement can be provided. 
A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the differences between acquisition 
processes in the United States and Taiwan using a case study approach. The methodology 
compares acquisition systems in the U.S. Navy (USN) and the Republic of China Navy 
(ROCN) by studying two specific naval shipbuilding programs, the U.S. littoral combat 
ship (LCS) program and Taiwan’s Tuo Chiang–class corvette program. At the conclusion 
of this research, the researcher identifies advantages in certain processes of one system 
over the other and provides recommendations for the USN and the ROCN to improve their 
acquisition processes. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Marcum and Milshyn (2014) noted in their research that many countries are in the 
process of transforming their defense acquisition process, in large part because of shrinking 
budgets and industrial globalization, as new international partnerships are formed and new 
applications for advanced technologies are developed. They argued that the United States 
has been experiencing defense budget cuts since the economic crisis in 2008; however, 
technology development and new global threats keep increasing the demand for defense 
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expenditure. Since the acquisition system was developed, it has gone through several 
changes in process. Nevertheless, there are still many obvious problems in the U.S. 
acquisition system in terms of requirement identification, resources, technology, and 
threats evolution. These factors cause defense acquisition reform initiatives to be 
ineffective, as Mortlock (2016) stated in his research that “decades of acquisition reform 
initiatives have failed to produce true innovation and change within defense acquisition” 
(p. 121). 
Similarly, Taiwan has faced difficulties in acquiring armaments that meet its 
requirements with a limited budget for decades. There is not a clear guideline covering all 
different defense acquisition cases in terms of the processes of a program. Setzekorn (2014) 
indicated that the cost and time spent on previous programs were often considered by the 
public to be inefficient, especially the political scandal involving the purchase of Lafayette-
class naval frigates. His research also implied that the scandal exposed Taiwan’s military 
to allegations of corruption, political cronyism, and even murder. As the scandal was 
slowly uncovered, efforts by opposition legislators and public calls for significant defense 
reforms culminated in the passage of two national defense laws that radically restructured 
Taiwan’s defense establishment. It is essential for Taiwan to improve its armament 
acquisition system, and studying the practices of other countries such as the United States 
might provide valuable insights into how it could be done. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research uses the case study method and statistical analysis to provide a 
thorough insight into the acquisition processes of the United States and Taiwan. Analyzing 
one specific Navy ship acquisition program from each country not only enables the 
researcher to narrow the research down to focused aspects but also provides examples of 
real-life applications of those theoretical regulations and processes. The information 
mentioned in this research was collected from periodical journals, research of other 
analysts, governmental reports, directives, instructions, and regulations. 
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D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
In acquisition, all cases differ from one another, and it is impossible to establish an 
overall understanding without studying each one. Notwithstanding, this research focuses 
only on specified Navy shipbuilding programs from both countries due to the limited time 
for research. In addition, some detailed acquisition guidance and documents are classified 
and are not available to the public. The analysis can be based only on accessible 
information and documents. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter introduces the broad concept of the acquisition systems in the United 
States and Taiwan, starting with introducing the basic concepts of defense acquisition and 
the three major systems of requirement, resources, and management. Although there are 
certainly differences between the two countries’ acquisition procedures, these three 
systems represent fundamental processes that every country goes through when 
developing, manufacturing, and procuring military systems. 
The detailed processes of each system in the two countries are then discussed for 
further comparison. Key departments and agencies are introduced to demonstrate their 
responsibilities in the process. The chapter ends with a conclusion showing the similarities 
and differences of the two systems. 
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEMS 
Marcum (2013) defined defense acquisition systems as a set of processes a 
government must undertake to “transform internal and external resources into weapon 
systems” (p. 2). According to Brown (2010), acquisition in general contains processes of 
“design, engineering, test and evaluation, production, and operations and support of 
defense systems” (p. 1). He also mentioned in the same article that “the term defense 
acquisition generally applies only to weapons and related items” (p. 1).  
1. U.S. Acquisition System 
In Mortlock’s (2021) study, he identified that the program manager in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for cost, schedule, and performance of 
assigned projects, which requires the program manager to utilize three support systems to 
operate the program: 
• the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) for 
generating the requirements for formal programs of record, 
• the Defense Acquisition Management System (recently renamed as the 
Adaptive Acquisition Framework) for controlling the progress of each 
phase through milestones, and 
6 
• the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System 
for the allocation of resources. (Mortlock, 2021) 
The three systems are commonly known as the “big ‘A’ acquisition,” whereas the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS), which emphasizes the actual process of acquiring the 
capability, is often referred to as “little ‘a’ acquisition” (see Figure 1; Schwartz, 2013). 
Hence, big “A” acquisition, which this article adopts to analyze case programs, covers a 
more complete view regarding the evolution of a program from the birth of an idea to the 
end of its life cycle. 
 
Figure 1. DOD’s Defense Acquisition Structure. Source: Department of 
Defense (2006). 
2. Taiwan’s Acquisition System 
The National Armed Forces Armament Acquisition Programming Regulation 
incorporates the requirement and defense acquisition systems into one integrated process. 
The regulation was revised in 2016, leading to some changes in the acquisition process.  
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Apart from the acquisition system, the Planning Budget System governs the 
resource allocation process. Both the acquisition system and budget system of Taiwan 
follow a phase-based framework, including design phase, programming phase, and 
budget/execution phase (Ministry of National Defense [MND], Taiwan, 2017). This 
framework is structured similar to the PPBE System of the United States (Yao, 2020). 
Although Taiwan does not address the big “A” acquisition framework in its acquisition 
system, the three components of it can be identified in the process. Figure 2 shows how 
each system of big “A” acquisition interacts with every step of Taiwan’s acquisition 
processes. 
 
Figure 2. Flowchart of Taiwan’s Defense Acquisition Process. 
Source: Yao (2020). 
B. REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM 
Government acquisition needs, based on the agency’s core mission, are identified 
during the agency’s strategic planning process. They can be driven bottom-up by the end 
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users, top-down by the management, or a combination of both. The needs are discovered 
in the capability gap (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2016). As to defense acquisition, 
Mortlock (2021) noted in his study that “the requirements generating system is driven 
primarily by a combination of capability needs and an evolving threat.”  
Once requirements are identified, they must be defined, developed, vetted, and 
prioritized to fit into the limited budget. This step is crucial to the whole program, as 
program failure—including cost overruns, schedule delays, and less optimal solutions to 
meet the needs—is often primarily due to poorly designed and constantly changing 
requirements (Federal Acquisition Institute, 2016).  
1. U.S. Requirements Process 
The U.S. military uses the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) to identify its requirements for the core missions of national defense. It enables 
the DOD to identify, assess, and prioritize requirements the military desires to fill the 
capability gap (Schwartz, 2013). The assessments are made with nation-level strategic 
guidance documents, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS). JCIDS also provides the baseline 
for documentation, review, and validation of capability requirements across the DOD. The 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is the supreme agency that governs the 
JCIDS process (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2018a). 
According to Manual of Operation for the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS, 2018b), the JCIDS process consists 
of several steps, starting with the identification of joint military capabilities by Capabilities-
Based Assessment (CBA), “an analytic basis to identify capability requirements and 
associated capability gaps” (Enclosure C). If the CBA identifies a capability gap and no 
similar capabilities exist in the Joint Force, the next step is to generate an Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD). Schwartz (2013) noted in his research that the JROC reviews and 
validates whether the capability in the ICD fulfills the gap in joint military capabilities 
before the approval of the ICD, which is followed by a recommendation of a materiel or 
non-materiel solution. He also mentioned that if a materiel solution is recommended, the 
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process moves into the DAS. Throughout the acquisition process, the JCIDS keeps 
interacting with the DAS in terms of the subsequent development of requirements 
documents. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the JCIDS deliberate process and how JCIDS 
interacts with the DAS throughout the program (JCS, 2018a). 
There are methods other than JCIDS that the U.S. military adopts to identify 
requirements, which are determined by DOD components (DOD, 2019). These methods 
may use other documents besides the ICD, such as directed requirements and urgent need 
statements, to support middle tier acquisition or urgent capability acquisition.  
 




Figure 4. Interaction of JCIDS Deliberate Path and Defense 
Acquisition Systems. Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018b). 
2. Taiwan’s Requirements Process 
The New Frontier Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee (2014), in the 
Defense Policy Blue Paper No. 7 (2014), discussed Taiwan’s requirements definition 
process, which happens in the design phase and includes several steps. First, the Office of 
the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Planning (J-3) generates Joint 
Warfighting Capability Planning (JWCP) based on the services’ operational requirements. 
Next, the MND’s Strategic Planning Department (SPD), the top leading organization of 
the process, considers the future technology trends and potential threats combining the 
requirements in the JWCP and produces the 10-Year Force Buildup Concept (TYFBC) 
document. Finally, the priorities of these requirements are determined in the SPD’s 
following 5-Year Force Construction Plan (FYFCP) document, according to which the 
Joint Staff Headquarters directs services put forth in the Operational Requirement 
Document (ORD), leading the program into the programming phase. 
In the revised process, the concept of top-down guidance along with the technology 
research and development capability are emphasized with the SPD directing the JWCP 
according to the TYFBC and, when applicable, the 5-Year Defense Science and 
Technology Research, Application, and Production Plan (FYDS&TAPP) developed by the 
National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST; MND, Taiwan, 
2016). The NCISIST, supervised by the MND, is an administrative corporation in charge 
of Taiwan’s defense technology establishment (Executive Yuan, Taiwan, 2014). The 
11 
NCSIST acts as the main advisor and sponsor when the program involves defense 
technology research and development. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Taiwan’s requirements process before and after revision, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5. Taiwan’s Requirements Process, before Revision. Source: 
MND, Taiwan (2002). 
 
Figure 6. Taiwan’s Requirements Process, after Revision. Source: 
MND, Taiwan (2002). 
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C. RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM 
Globally, the cost of national defense has been increasing significantly, while 
events such as the economic crisis in 2007 dramatically affect the allocation of defense 
budgets in most countries (Marcum & Milshyn, 2014). Hence, a resource allocation system 
is important for governments to invest in military since the resources are limited for any 
country. The systems enable governments to allocate limited resources in order to make 
the most efficient and effective use of them and to meet national security objectives (Lorge, 
2018). The United States developed the Planning, Programming, and Budget System 
(PPBS) in 1963 to measure the requirements for and sufficiency of defense programs. The 
system went through several modifications in following years and was changed to the 
PPBE System in 2003 (Grimes, 2008). Taiwan, similarly, referred to the PPBS of the 
United States and developed the Planning Budget System in 1971 (Huang & Wang, 2018). 
1. U.S. Resource Allocation System 
According to DOD Directive 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and Execution (PPBE) Process (DOD, 2013), in the first phase of the PPBE process, “the 
planning phase, the military role and defense posture of the United States and the DOD in 
the world environment shall be examined, considering enduring national security 
objectives and the need for efficient management of defense resources” (p. 10). The 
undersecretary of defense for policy leads the phase and reviews the NSS, the NDS, and 
the NMS to develop the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in accordance with national 
strategy (McGarry & Peters, 2018).  
McGarry and Peters (2018) state in their Congressional Research Service report 
that the next step happens in the programming phase, led by the Director of the Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE) Office, and the purpose is to “analyze the 
anticipated effects of present-day decisions on the future force” (p. 1). In this phase, “The 
DOD Components shall develop proposed programs consistent with the planning guidance, 
programming guidance, and fiscal guidance” (DOD, 2013, p. 11). As McGarry and Peters 
(2018) mentioned, this step generates a Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which 
contains a description of each DOD component’s budget requirements for upcoming years. 
13 
“Once each service submits a POM, CAPE leads the reviews of the programs, forecasts the 
resource requirements for the next 5 years, and updates the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP)” (McGarry & Peters, 2018, p. 2).  
The budgeting phase, led by the undersecretary of defense (comptroller)/chief 
financial officer (USD(C)/CFO), takes place simultaneously with the programming phase 
(Schwartz, 2013). In this phase, military services complete a Budget Estimate Submission 
(BES), which is then reviewed by the USD(C)/CFO in accordance with guidance from the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). After the BES is approved, it is submitted to 
the OMB to be included in the president’s annual budget request to Congress (McGarry & 
Peters, 2018). 
In the final execution phase, the performance evaluation of the programs, also 
known as execution review, takes place along with the program review and the budget 
review (McGarry & Peters, 2018). The evaluation includes metrics of funding obligations 
and expenditures (Schwartz, 2013). Figure 7 demonstrates the U.S. PPBE process. 
14 
 
Figure 7. PPBE Process. Source: AcqNotes (2020). 
2. Taiwan’s Resource Allocation System 
Taiwan developed its Planning Budget System in 1971, based on the U.S. PPBS. 
Unlike the PPBE system currently adopted by the United States, Taiwan’s system lacks the 
execution phase and is divided into the design phase, programming phase, and budgeting 
phase, which are also reflected in the whole acquisition process (Huang & Wang, 2018). 
In the design phase, the TYFBC and FYFCP, completed by the SPD in the 
requirements process, act respectively as the criteria for Defense Finance Resource 
Judgment (DFRJ) and Defense Finance Resource Guidance (DFRG; Yang, 2007). The 
DFRJ and DFRG, conducted by the Comptroller Bureau of the MND, work as the national 
long-term and mid-term finance resource plan (MND, Taiwan, 2012b).  
Moving to the programming phase, the Resource Planning Department (RPD) of 
the MND establishes the 5-Year Administrative Plan (FYAP) according to the DFRJ and 
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DFRG. The services and departments of the MND then develop the Annual Administrative 
Plan (AAP) for the next fiscal year accordingly.  
According to Taiwan’s Budget Act (2016), there are four stages of the budget 
legislation process in the budgeting phase. First, once the MND collects the AAPs from all 
its subordinates, the Budget Estimate of MND is established and submitted to the Executive 
Yuan (the administrative organization that governs all the ministries in Taiwan). Next, the 
Executive Yuan organizes the budget estimate from all the ministries and forms the Budget 
Proposal of the central government for the next fiscal year. After the Legislative Yuan (the 
congress of Taiwan) reviews and approves the Budget Proposal, the Legal Budget is 
determined and announced by the president 15 days before the fiscal year starts. Finally, 
the annual budget distributed to all government agencies for execution is then called the 
Distribution Budget. Figure 8 shows Taiwan’s Planning Budget System. 
 
Figure 8. Taiwan’s Planning Budget System 
D. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
U.S. defense acquisition programs facilitate the development, testing, procurement, 
and fielding of capabilities to warfighters (Mortlock, 2021). The processes require 
significant effort for researching new technologies and testing the capabilities, which takes 
a long time to accomplish. A well-developed system is essential for the program managers 
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to follow and overlook the progress to ensure that capabilities can be delivered to 
warfighters on time. Although acquisition systems might differ between countries, they 
often share the same concept of dividing the process into phases for better control of the 
progress (Lorge, 2018). 
1. U.S. Defense Acquisition Process 
The U.S. DAS, driven by milestones, is governed by DOD Directive 5000.01, The 
Defense Acquisition System, DOD Instruction 5000.02T, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition 
Framework.  
As stated in DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework 
(DOD, 2020a), the DOD implemented the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) in 
order to update the DAS, which provides six pathways for different types of acquisition 
programs, including urgent capability, middle tier, major capability, software, defense 
business systems, and services. My research focuses on the major capability acquisition 
pathway, which “is designed to support major defense acquisition programs, major 
systems, and other complex acquisitions [with the purpose to] acquire and modernize 
military unique programs that provide enduring capability” (DOD, 2020a, p. 12). Figure 9 
demonstrates the six pathways of AAF.  
The structure of the major capability acquisition sets “milestones” to separate 
phases apart from each other. An acquisition program, led by a program manager (PM), 
must complete regulatory requirements before entering the next phase (Schwartz, 2013). 
The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) can decide if the program is approved to enter 
the next phase (DOD, 2018).  
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Figure 9. Six Pathways of AAF. Source: DOD (2020a). 
The DOD issued DODI 5000.02T, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, in 
2015, according to which a Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review must be done 
to decide on a materiel or non-materiel solution and review the Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) when an ICD is completed from the JCIDS. The instruction also states that if a 
materiel solution is approved, the program enters the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) 
phase, in which the validated capability gaps are translated into “system-specific 
requirements including the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System 
Attributes (KSAs), and to conduct planning to support a decision on the acquisition strategy 
for the product” (DOD, 2015, p. 18). Key activities in this phase include “AoA solutions; 
key trades among cost, schedule, and performance; affordability analysis; risk analysis; 
and planning for risk mitigation” (DOD, 2015, p. 18).  
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The program must pass the Milestone A review to enter the next phase, the 
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, according to the same 
instruction. At the Milestone A review, the MDA examines the program’s acquisition 
strategy, risk assessment, and affordability analysis. The purpose of the TMRR phase is to 
“reduce technology, engineering, integration, and life-cycle cost risk” (DOD, 2015, p. 21). 
The instruction identifies the key activities in this phase including Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR), competitive prototyping, and Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA). 
Also, a Capability Development Document (CDD), which “provides a basis for preliminary 
design activities and the PDR” (p. 23), should be developed to replace the original ICD in 
this phase. Following the validation of CDD is the Development Request for Proposal 
Release Decision (DRFPRD), in which the acquisition strategy is determined. The program 
passes Milestone B when it is approved in the DRFPRD, unless any significant changes 
occur or additional information is unavailable. Once Milestone B is completed, the MDA 
approves the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), signifying the official initiation of the 
program and the beginning of the next phase. 
The purpose of the next phase, the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) phase, as DODI 5000.02T describes, is to “develop, build, and test a product to 
verify that all operational and derived requirements have been met, and to support 
production or deployment decisions” (DOD, 2015, p. 27). Key activities in this phase, 
according to the same instruction, include Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), 
Operational Assessments (OA), and critical design review. When the program meets all 
the EMD criteria, the phase ends and the program reaches Milestone C, in which the MDA 
considers “any new validated threat environments that might affect operational 
effectiveness” (p. 31). 
After the approval of Milestone C is the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase, 
the purpose of which, as the DOD defines in DODI 500.02T, is to “produce and deliver 
requirements-compliant products to receiving military organizations” (DOD, 2015, p. 30), 
meaning that the identified capabilities can be delivered to the demanding units and can be 
used in operations. The instruction also notes that this phase incorporates activities such as 
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), Limited Deployment, Operational Test and 
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Evaluation (OT&E), and the Full-Rate Production Decision (FRPD) or the Full 
Deployment Decision followed by full-rate production or full deployment. According to 
Schwartz’s (2013) research, he concludes the process afterwards as, 
• upon completion of OT&E,  
• demonstration of adequate control over manufacturing processes, 
• and with the approval of the MDA,  
• a program can go into full-rate production (p. 10).  
He also adds, in his research, the difference between Initial Operating Capability 
(IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC). He describes them as follows: 
• IOC can be attained when enough systems are delivered and other 
predefined criteria are met, allowing for some degree of operations.  
• FOC is achieved when the system is ready to operate as required 
(Schwartz, 2013, p. 10).  
The final Operations and Support (O&S) phase, which comes after but often 
overlaps with the P&D phase, focuses on capability sustainment all the way to disposal 
(DOD, 2015). Figure 10 shows the process of the U.S. DAS. 
 
Figure 10. U.S. DAS Process. Source: DOD (2020a). 
Shipbuilding programs, compared to other acquisition programs, are different in 
some respects. Drezner et al. (2011) described in their research that “the quantities, the 
amount of time to build, and the overlap between the design and construction phases make 
it difficult for ships to fit in the DODI 5000 process” (p. 23). The researchers also stated 
that programs are officially initiated after the authorization of Milestone B in most cases, 
whereas shipbuilding programs can be initiated earlier at Milestone A once required 
processes are completed. Similarly, the approval of Milestone B, rather than Milestone C 
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in other programs, authorizes the construction of the lead ship, which can be considered 
the LRIP for shipbuilding programs.  
As a result, the Department of the Navy (DON) established Navy-specified policies 
to supplement DOD instructions for the JCIDS and DAS within the DON. Two-Pass, 
Seven-Gate Governance procedures were formalized to provide an integrated, 
collaborative, and disciplined framework for Navy leaders to resolve the inconsistence 
between DOD regulations and the practice of actual shipbuilding programs (Department 
of the Navy [DON], 2019). Pass 1 comprises the three requirement gates, including the 
concept refinement phase. Pass 2 starts at the completion of Pass 1, just before Milestone 
A, and ends at program completion (Drezner et al., 2011). The process and required 
documents or activities at each gate are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Two-Pass, Seven-Gate Process. Source: DON (2019). 
2. Taiwan’s Defense Acquisition Process 
In Taiwan’s defense acquisition process, the requirement is identified in the design 
phase, and the ORD is developed at the beginning of the programming phase. The process 
continues with the service producing a System Analysis Report (SAR), in which the cost-
performance of the program is assessed (MND, Taiwan, 2002). After the Integrated 
Assessment Department (IAD) approves the SAR, the service needs to develop an 
Investment Outline, which is then reviewed by the Armaments Bureau and the General 
Staff Headquarters. Once the Investment Outline is approved, the documents (ORD, SAR, 
and Investment Outline) are integrated into the FYAP and reviewed in the Planning Budget 
System. After the program undergoes the budgeting process and is approved by the 
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Legislative Yuan, the program is executed by the service that puts forward the requirement 
(MND, Taiwan, 2002). In the execution phase, the program is reviewed and supervised by 
the MND, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan; however, the specifics of how 
the review and supervision are conducted are not incorporated in this regulation. 
In the revised process, the SAR and Investment Outline are combined into the 
Integrated Acquisition Plan (IAP), which is produced by the services, the NCSIST, or both, 
depending on the amount of budget and whether the program involves technology research 
and development (R&D). Considerations in the IAP include assessment on indigenous 
development capability, logistics planning, acquisition approaches, cost-performance 
analysis, program management planning, and budget allocation (MND, Taiwan, 2016). 
After the IAP is reviewed and approved by the MND, the program enters the budgeting 
process. Once it is approved by the Legislative Yuan, the program is executed by the 
service or the Armaments Bureau if the program is led by NCSIST (MND, Taiwan, 2016). 
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate Taiwan’s acquisition process before and after revision, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 12. Taiwan’s Acquisition Process, before Revision. Source: 
MND, Taiwan (2002). 
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Figure 13. Taiwan Acquisition Process, after Revision. Source: MND, 
Taiwan (2016). 
Most shipbuilding contractors in Taiwan are not capable of designing and 
developing ships that fit in the Navy’s future operation requirements considering the 
foresight technology they demand. The design and R&D processes need to be done (mostly 
by the Navy Shipbuilding and Development Center and Ship and Ocean Industries R&D 
Center) before contractors can start to build ships. The weapon systems, on the other hand, 
are developed and constructed separately by the NCSIST (Shiu, 2018). The ship design 
procedures, including feasibility study, preliminary design, contract design, and detail 
design, often begin simultaneously with the programming process. 
Research by Ou (2017) illustrated how Taiwan’s shipbuilding process works. First, 
after the ORD is completed, the process starts with the conception design phase, in which 
the feasibility analysis and concept design are done by the Navy Headquarters and the Navy 
Shipbuilding and Development Center. Second, the preliminary design and contract design 
are made in the exhibition phase by a separate contractor, which is not necessarily the same 
as the contractor that builds the ships. Third, in the engineering development phase, the 
shipbuilding contractor conducts the detail design and acquisition/building regulation, and 
starts to build the prototype ship after the AAP is approved in the Legislative Yuan. Finally, 
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after the prototype is built, the Navy begins test and evaluation for potential design 
modification in follow-up ships, which may then be further modified or adjusted along 
their life cycle according to their operational performance (see Figure 14; Navy Command 
R.O.C., n.d.-c). 
 
Figure 14. Taiwan Shipbuilding Process. Source: Navy Command 
R.O.C. (n.d.-c). 
E. COMPARISON 
The overall structures of the acquisition components of the United States and 
Taiwan are quite similar to each other, as both incorporate requirement, resource allocation, 
and acquisition management processes. In addition, being based on the U.S. PPBE system, 
Taiwan’s resource allocation system is almost identical to the U.S. system with planning, 
programming, and budgeting phases. Although the execution phase is not included, the 
MND has its own regulations for controlling the budget execution progress. Furthermore, 
both countries implement unique regulations for shipbuilding programs considering their 
complexity and uncertainty, and the huge amount of time and cost they require.  
However, the two countries’ acquisition frameworks do differ in some ways. First, 
unlike the U.S. JCIDS system, Taiwan does not have an independent system to govern the 
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requirement identification process. The requirement procedures are only roughly 
mentioned in the same regulation for managing acquisition processes. Second, the 
acquisition regulation in Taiwan only incorporates the process to the approval of the 
program. How MND components manage the execution of the program is not noted. On 
the contrary, the U.S. system covers the process all the way to the deployment and disposal, 
forming a more complete guidance for the whole life cycle of the weapon system. Finally, 
the U.S. AAF framework includes different pathways for different types of acquisitions. 
Taiwan, on the other hand, only includes two different types of acquisition pathways, 
which differ from each other in terms of whether the NCSIST is involved in the program. 
Regarding shipbuilding processes, the U.S. Navy has a special instruction that is 
applicable to managing shipbuilding programs, since shipbuilding programs often cannot 
fit in the time frames of the regular acquisition process. The specified instruction controls 
the shipbuilding progress by setting seven “gates” as the junctures of time for critical 
documents or actions. The framework, despite having its own distinct process, still follows 
the three-milestone structure of the DOD’s overall acquisition system. In contrast, 
Taiwan’s shipbuilding process only emphasizes the order of major actions along the way 
but does not stress on the required documents along each step in the process. Instead of 
introducing a different process, the pathway for shipbuilding programs brings in additional 
procedures, which is parallel to the regular acquisition process and illustrates the 
prerequisite analytical works exclusively for designing warships. The additional 
procedures, conducted by the Navy Headquarters, the Navy Shipbuilding and Development 
Center, and the contractor for preliminary design and contract design, interact with the 
ordinary pathway only at the very beginning—after the ORD is developed and at the point 
when the AAP is approved and the contractor is awarded for detail design and prototype 
ship construction.  
In summary, the acquisition systems of the United States are more completed, more 
detailed, and more clearly stated in instructions and directives compared to Taiwan’s 
regulations. Moreover, even though Taiwan has a similar acquisition structure to run the 
same functions as the U.S. system, the borders separating requirement, resource allocation, 
and acquisition processes are not as clear as the U.S. structure since no specified 
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instructions govern each of them. Although guidance specifying more detailed procedures 
and required documents might exist in each component of the Taiwan MND for staff 
members to follow, it is not available to the public or integrated as a series of systemic, 
organized, and numbered instructions, making it more difficult for researchers to analyze 
the system.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews previous work containing an analysis of acquisition processes 
in the United States and Taiwan, along with the constraints both countries have been facing. 
A defense acquisition system can be defined as a set of processes that countries use 
to convert resources into weapon systems to satisfy national security requirements (Lorge, 
2018). In both the United States and Taiwan, the process of defense acquisition is a 
complex and lengthy series of steps, walking through several departments in the 
government and reviewed by officials with various areas of expertise and responsibilities. 
Moreover, it often requires an enormous amount of budget to run a single acquisition 
project. According to Taiwan’s 2019 National Defense Report, military acquisitions cost 
the MND of Taiwan NT$89.8 billion (US$3.09 billion) in 2019, approximately 26.3% of 
the total yearly defense budget (MND, Taiwan, 2019). The DOD, on the other hand, 
requested $243.4 billion in acquisition funding, including $134.9 billion for procurement 
and $106.6 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2021 (DOD, 2020b). 
Marcum and Milshyn’s (2014) research analyzed global economics and new 
challenges, demonstrating the changes occurring in global defense research, development, 
and acquisition (RDA) systems. The challenge for most nations in the coming decade will 
be how to articulate and achieve national security requirements. While the defense budget 
is under the pressure of growing demands, many nations still face the issue of budget cuts 
in defense (Marcum & Milshyn, 2014).  
Lorge (2018) conducted a research comparing the efficiency of naval acquisitions 
in the United States and in China. In the research, he analyzed the acquisition efficiency of 
both countries in terms of 10 key areas; in seven of those areas, the United States 
outperformed China. However, the research also pointed out that China stood out in cost 
and schedule performance, and the United States had to improve its acquisition systems in 
order to secure its leading position.  
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As for Taiwan, there is an analysis of Taiwan’s self-reliance of armaments 
acquisition that illustrates Taiwan’s insufficient self-reliant capability in national defense 
compared to other nations that are also considered U.S. allies, such as South Korea and 
Israel. After the implementation of the National Defense Act in 2002, Taiwan set a goal to 
establish a self-reliant national defense. Nevertheless, due to both internal and external 
factors, there has been only limited achievement in terms of indigenously developed 
armaments. External factors include intervention by the United States and China. Despite 
the fact that Taiwan is a U.S. ally, the United States prefers that the development of 
Taiwan’s armed forces be under U.S. control. The best balance for the United States is 
keeping Taiwan away from Chinese invasion without allowing them the capability to attack 
across the Taiwan Strait. China, on the other hand, has always firmly claimed the “one 
China policy” to other countries, making them reluctant to collaborate with Taiwan 
regarding national defense affairs. 
One internal factor is the constant personnel changes at the leadership and 
management level. Taiwan is a democratic country, where the president and congressmen 
are elected every 4 years. Because the two major political parties have different approaches 
to foreign policy, especially toward China, transition of the administrations and changes to 
public political stances often discontinue the progress of certain programs. Second, 
according to the government structure of Taiwan, self-reliant defense involves the MND, 
the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Technology. There is not a concentrated 
leading organization managing the process, making it hard for the MND to acquire all the 
resources it needs to develop self-reliant defense. Last, guidance on the defense acquisition 
process is not complete. Different leaders can often alter the priority of different armaments 
according to their preferences, making it hard to sustain a long-term defense development 
strategy. The possible solutions are integrating the systems and developing supportive 
regulations (Yao, 2020).  
Throughout Taiwan’s history, most of its Navy’s ships were purchased or supported 
by the United States. After the official foreign relationship with Taiwan ended, the United 
States was allowed to provide Taiwan only defensive weapons in limited numbers (Peng, 
2016). Taiwan had to rely on indigenous developed weapon systems to sustain defensive 
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capabilities. The proportion of warships built domestically hence increased. Since 1989, 
the MND has implemented “new generation shipbuilding” programs, including Cheng 
Kung–class frigates, Chin Chiang–class frigates, Tuo Chiang–class frigates, and Kuang 
Hua VI–class missile boats (see Figure 15; Peng, 2016). Considering Taiwan’s demand in 
Navy combat capability, it is important to analyze previous warship acquisition 
performance to identify potential improvement. 
 
Figure 15. Taiwan Indigenous Built Ships. Source: Navy Command 
R.O.C. (n.d.-b). 
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IV. THE CASE STUDY 
In this chapter, real life shipbuilding acquisition programs are analyzed to examine 
how acquisition systems work in both the United States and Taiwan. The national strategies 
and objectives of the two countries are different from each other. The United States is a 
maritime nation with its security and prosperity depending on the seas. The U.S. Navy’s 
ultimate strategic goal is to maintain the capability of projecting operations globally to 
sustain its military influence (DON, 2020). In comparison, the vision and main mission of 
the Taiwan Navy focus on conducting defense operations and protecting sea power in 
Taiwanese maritime space against China’s threat of blockade and interception (MND, 
Taiwan, n.d.). 
Despite of the differences between the Navy’s strategic goals of the two countries, 
the U.S. littoral combat ship (LCS) program and Taiwan’s Tuo Chiang1–class corvette 
program share some similarities in terms of the design concept. The two classes of ships 
were both designed with the capabilities of stealth, high speed, and littoral combat. 
Moreover, both the programs have been through major changes regarding the design 
concepts, shipbuilding schedules, and budget (Chu, 2018a; Work, 2014). Hence, analyzing 
these two programs can yield information regarding how the acquisition processes govern 
the acquisition programs and how they can be improved. 
A. U.S. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM 
The LCS program, launched on November 1, 2001, is aimed at acquiring next-
generation surface combatants with relatively lower cost. The LCS is focused primarily on 
antisubmarine, mine countermeasure, and surface warfare against small boats particularly 
in littoral areas, rather than other multi-mission combatants. With the modular design, the 
ships’ mission orientation can be changed by replacing the mission packages (O’Rourke, 
2012). The LCS class consists of two variants, the Freedom variant and the Independence 
variant, designed by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, respectively. To date, 35 
 
1 Tuo Chiang is also translated as Tuo River or Tuo Jiang. 
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LCSs have been awarded, and 19 ships have been delivered. FY2019 was the final year 
programmed for LCS seaframes (America’s Navy, n.d.). Table 1 shows the characteristics 
and ship lists of the two variants of LCS. 
Table 1. Ship List of LCSs. Source: America’s Navy (n.d.). 
Freedom variant Independence variant 
  
General Characteristics: 
Builder: Lockheed Martin 
Length: 387.6 ft (118.1 m) 
Beam: 57.7 ft (17.6 m) 
Displacement.: approximately 3,450 MT full 
load 
Draft: 14.1 feet (4.3 m) 
Speed: 40+ knots 
 
General Characteristics: 
Builder: General Dynamics (LCS 2 and LCS 
4), Austal USA (LCS 6 and follow) 
Length: 421.5 ft (128.5 m)  
Beam: 103.7 ft (31.6 m) 
Displacement.: approximately 3,200 MT full 
load 
Draft: 15.1 feet (4.6 m) 
Speed: 44 knots 
 
Ships:  
USS Freedom (LCS 1), San Diego, CA 
USS Sioux City (LCS 11), Mayport, FL 
USS Wichita (LCS 13), Naval Station Mayport 
USS Billings (LCS 15), Mayport, FL 
USS Indianapolis (LCS 17) - Mayport, FL 
PCU St. Louis (LCS 19) - undergoing trials 
PCU Minneapolis-St. Paul (LCS 21) - under 
construction 
PCU Cooperstown (LCS 23) - under 
construction 
PCU Marinette (LCS 25) - under construction 
PCU Nantucket (LCS 27) - in preproduction 
phase 
PCU Beloit (LCS 29) - in preproduction phase 
USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), San Diego, CA 
Ships:  
USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), San 
Diego, CA 
USS Omaha (LCS 12), San Diego, CA 
USS Manchester (LCS 14), San Diego, CA 
USS Tulsa (LCS 16), San Diego, CA 
USS Charleston (LCS 18), San Diego, CA 
USS Independence (LCS 2), San Diego, CA 
USS Cincinnati (LCS 20), San Diego, CA 
PCU Kansas City (LCS 22) - delivered 
PCU Oakland (LCS 24) - under construction 
PCU Mobile (LCS 26) - under construction 
PCU Savannah (LCS 28) - under construction 
PCU Canberra (LCS 30) - under construction 
PCU Santa Barbara (LCS 32) - in 
preproduction phase 
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Freedom variant Independence variant 
PCU Cleveland (LCS 31) - in preproduction 
phase 
USS Milwaukee (LCS 5), Mayport, FL 
USS Detroit (LCS 7), Mayport, FL 
USS Little Rock (LCS 9), Mayport, FL 
 
PCU Augusta (LCS 34) - in preproduction 
phase 
PCU Kingsville (LCS 36) - in preproduction 
phase 
PCU Pierre (LCS 38) - in preproduction phase 
USS Coronado (LCS 4), San Diego, CA 
USS Jackson (LCS 6), San Diego, CA 
USS Montgomery (LCS 8), San Diego, CA 
 
 
1. Requirements Process 
According to a Congressional Research Service report conducted by O’Rourke 
(2003), the Navy’s need for LCSs was first mentioned in the Mission Need Statement 
(MNS) of the DD-21 destroyer program in 1994, which was terminated in following years; 
however, the program “did not focus on potential littoral challenges” (p. 30). In 2001, the 
Navy conducted an analysis identifying gaps or weaknesses in Navy capabilities, which 
emphasized littoral anti-access capabilities. The DOD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) further identified increasing threats of adversaries’ anti-access and area-denial 
capabilities, which affected the United States’ force projection and sustainment in critical 
areas. As described in the same report, “Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel 
submarines, and advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and amphibious 
forces to operate in littoral waters” (DOD, 2001, p. 31). The QDR also directed the 
requirements for rapid response to events and task-organized modular units to deter or 
defeat an adversary.  
Former Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work illustrated the process of the 
LCS program in his article, “The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why” 
(Work, 2014). He noted, “On November 1, 2001, the Navy announced it would build a 
small, fast, and stealthy Littoral Combat Ship as part of its new DD(X) surface combatant 
family of ships” (p. 2). Next, throughout 2002 and 2003, Navy leaders developed “the key 
conceptual principles and characteristics that would guide the subsequent development of 
the LCS program” (p. 6). The article also indicated that documents illustrating the 
development include “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” by Admiral 
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Vern Clark in 2002; the Draft Littoral Combat Ship Interim Requirements Document (IRD), 
also finished in 2002; and the initial LCS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), approved in 
2003. 
The Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document (PD-IRD) of LCSs was 
then issued by the DON in February 2003, which demonstrated the mission requirements 
for LCSs. According to the document, “The LCS will deliver focused mission capabilities 
to enable joint and friendly forces to operate effectively in the littoral” (DON, 2003, p. 2). 
These focused mission capabilities are 
• an enhanced mine warfare capability,  
• a better shallow-water antisubmarine warfare capability,  
• an effective counter to small craft, 
• and other missions such as Maritime Interdiction Operations and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (DON, 2003, p. 2).  
In 2004, the CDD of LCS programs was approved. Instead of being developed 
through the JCIDS process, the requirements of the LCS were directed by the Navy leaders. 
Without clear guidance to follow, some analytical procedures were not conducted timely 
through the requirements process. Congress once expressed its concern that “rigorous 
analysis” (Morgan, 2003) of the need for the LCS came mainly after the Navy’s decision 
to develop the program, including the AoA, which was typically performed before the start 
of a major acquisition program. Without the AoA, the program raised arguments about 
whether this kind of smaller combatant could be the best answer to the identified threats 
(O’Rourke, 2003). 
2. Resource Allocation Process 
After the capability gaps for the Navy were identified, the DPG for FY2003 to 
FY2007 directed the Navy to develop the “capability to maintain an Aircraft Carrier 
Operating Area clear of submarine-delivered and floating mines.” The guidance also 
indicated the demand to “improve the capability to destroy or evade large numbers of 
submarines operating in littoral areas,” and “the capability to destroy large numbers of 
small anti-ship cruise missile-armed combatants, or armed merchant vessels in littoral areas, 
without relying on carrier-based air” (DOD, 2002). In accordance with the DPG, the LCS 
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program was designed and built to counter these three threats (Work, 2014). Chief of Naval 
Operations Vernon E. Clark then declared the LCS program his budget priority as it 
represented the idea of “transformational” system, which Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld emphasized. The LCS program was approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in 2002 
and was incorporated in the DOD’s FY2003 President’s Budget submission (Work, 2014).  
Concerned by the Navy’s lack of analytical research before the program, Congress 
authorized the Navy $4 million for requirements development for the LCS in the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2003 and 2004 and mandated the Navy to address the 
plan and schedule for meeting the requirements stated in DOD instructions before the 
Milestone A decision for initiation of concept and technology development (O’Rourke, 
2003). In the NDAA 2005, Congress approved the Navy’s plan to build the first two LCS 
seaframes (one ship for each variant), with the first ship (LCS 1) funded in 2005 
(O’Rourke, 2012). The second ship (LCS 2) was then funded in 2006, along with two 
additional ships (LCS 3 and LCS 4). In the same year, Congress also addressed a 
procurement budget limit of $220 million per ship on the fifth and sixth ships, which were 
both funded later in 2007 (O’Rourke, 2012).  
Because of the loss of internal control, the Navy found that the budget projection 
of the LCS program increased significantly. As a result, the Navy requested the 
cancellation of LCSs 3 through 6 and began to restructure the program in 2007, including 
increasing the procurement cost cap to $460 million per ship (Work, 2014). Congress 
accepted the cancellation and agreed with the increased cost cap but requested the cost cap 
to be addressed not only in FY2008 but in the subsequent years (O’Rourke, 2012). The 
Navy proposed to implement a dual-award acquisition strategy in 2010, awarding each of 
both bidders (Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics) a 10-ship block buy contract to 
reduce the procurement cost. This was in contrast to the down select strategy the Navy 
originally proposed, in which the Navy planned to select one contractor to build all 
following ships with a single design. After a hearing held by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee to review the strategy, Congress granted the Navy authority to implement the 
new strategy (O’Rourke, 2016). 
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The original plan for the Navy was to procure 52 LCSs in 2019 and subsequent 
years. However, as a result of the Force Structure Analysis (FSA) the Navy conducted in 
2016, the 335-ship force-level goal was established, in which the 52 small surface 
combatants were divided into 32 LCSs and 20 frigates. Hence, as the Navy shifted its 
procurement priority to a new frigate called FFG(X), the target number for LCSs was 
reduced to 35 ships, making FY2019 the final year for LCS procurement (O’Rourke, 2019).  
3. Acquisition Process 
The acquisition process of the LCS program differs from DOD and DON 
instructions in terms of the time each decision point was made. The program was initiated 
when the PD-IRD was released along with the RFP in 2003, 1 year before the completion 
of the official CDD, meaning the program was initiated way before the Milestone A 
decision (Murphy, 2017). In defense of Congress’s concern that the Navy did not complete 
an official AoA and other required documents regulated by DOD instructions (such as 
ICDs and CDDs) before releasing the RFP for LCSs, the Navy claimed that proper 
prerequisite analyses and research had been made in several research studies that led to the 
concept of LCSs, such as SC-21 Mission Needs Statement, the Naval War College’s 
Focused Mission Ship Characteristics Study, Focused Mission Ship Technologies 
Opportunities Study, and the LCS Analysis of Multiple Concepts (O’Rourke, 2003). 
Despite the fact that there might be some gray area as to whether these previous research 
studies provided sufficient analytical support for the requirement documents, the Navy 
conducted supplemental analyses and completed the official CDD in response to 
Congress’s demand in 2004, making the formal mark of Milestone A behind the initiation 
of the program (Murphy, 2017). 
The development of the LCS program can divided into three major parts. The first 
part is the designation development, including the Flight 0 prototype seaframe building. In 
the LCS solicitation documents, there were fewer defined parameters for the contractors to 
follow but more conceptual materials, which provided more space for creativity (Murphy, 
2017). This kind of approach led to two very different design variants, the pros and cons 
of which could not be identified without further test and evaluation (T&E) of the prototype 
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ships. The second part of the program is the changeable modular mission package, which 
reflects one of the requirements shown in the PD-IRD: “The LCS shall be configured with 
core systems and a Mission Package that will enable the ship to perform all core ship 
functions and at least one focused mission or inherent capability” (DON, 2003). The chief 
of naval operations at that time, Admiral Vern Clark, mentioned in his statement before the 
House Appropriations Committee that “it will be the first Navy ship to separate capability 
from hull form” (Statement, 2003), implicating the risk under the new kind of shipbuilding 
approach. The major operational capabilities of mission module packages include mine 
countermeasures, surface warfare, anti-submarine, and surface-to-surface missiles (Work, 
2014). The final part of the program is the building of the final designed form of the LCS 
seaframe, the Flight 1 ships, which would be down selected from one of the two Flight 0 
design variants and refined after the operational T&E of the first two prototype ships 
(Work, 2014). 
After the contracts were awarded to Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics for 
the R&D along with the build of each variant, the Navy expected the first two Flight 0 
ships to be delivered in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Hence, the Navy planned to build the 
Flight 1 follow-up ships in 2008 (Work, 2014). However, several obstacles showed up 
along the way, including the underestimated cost per hull of the first two ships (USS 
Independence and USS Freedom), the Budget Control Act in 2012, and the insufficient 
time frame for Navy leaders to down select the better variant for Flight 1 ships. As a result, 
the program delayed significantly from the original schedule, leading the Navy to make 
alternative decisions in order to keep the program going. One of these decisions was adding 
two more Flight 0 ships (LCS 3 and 4) in order to keep the two contractors busy before the 
down select decision was made. Moreover, the Navy later decided to build nine more ships 
(LCS 5–13, referred to as the Flight 0+ ships) in both design variants for delaying the final 
Flight 1 decision (Work, 2014). In 2010, with the competitive proposals from both builders, 
the Navy changed its strategy and decided to keep both designs for future Flight 1 
shipbuilding (Work, 2014).  
The other issue brought by the rising cost, arguably the worst one, was the delay of 
the mission package development. As mentioned in the Government Accountability Office 
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(GAO)’s 2016 testimony, “Since 2007, delivery of the total initial mission package 
operational capability has been delayed by about 9 years (from 2011 to 2020) and the Navy 
has lowered the level of performance needed to achieve the initial capability for two 
packages—surface warfare and mine countermeasures” (Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate, 
2016). It was also mentioned that many T&E works could not be done without the mission 
packages, despite the fact that the first LCS was delivered to the Navy in 2008. The mine 
countermeasure module, especially, was delayed 7 years from 2005 to 2020 before 
providing IOC to the program. Figure 16 shows the IOC delays of each mission package 
since 2007. With delays in different parts of the program and each one having impact on 
one another, it is difficult to define the milestone decision points along the process. If taking 
the delays in mission packages into consideration, the program as a whole did not reach 
Milestone B before 2013 when the cost estimate for the mine countermeasure module was 
delivered, even though several ships had already been in service for years (Sherman, 2013). 
With the change of Navy strategy in 2019, the CONOPS for LCSs was substituted 
by a new class of frigates, the FFG(X). Despite the fact that designs and concepts of the 
LCS might be inherited by the new frigate program, this new strategy signals that the LCS 
program is heading towards its end (O’Rourke, 2019). Undergoing several cost overruns, 
delays in process, changes in design and concept, and reduction of production amount, 
some argue that the LCS program could not fully fulfill the capability the Navy designed 
at the beginning of the process (Work, 2014).  
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Figure 16. Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Operational Delays 
Since 2007. Source: Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate (2016). 
B. TAIWAN TUO CHIANG–CLASS CORVETTE 
The Tuo Chiang–class corvette program was initiated in 2010 with a plan to build 
eight to 12 next-generation corvettes in response to China’s fast growing naval power. This 
new class of indigenous designed warships was designed with emphasis on mobility, 
stealth, firepower, and capability to operate in harsh seas in order to fulfill “hit-and-run” 
tactics against People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) aircraft carrier fleet (LaGrone, 
2014). Moreover, the Taiwan Navy intended to enhance the capability of domestic 
shipbuilders to build advanced ships. The lead ship, PGG-618 Tuo Chiang, was built as the 
prototype ship and delivered to the Taiwan Navy in 2015, whereas the following ships were 
programmed into two batches. In 2020, the president of Taiwan announced that the first 
batch of six ships would be delivered before 2023. To date, the second ship, PGG-619 Ta 
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Chiang, is currently under T&E and is expected to be delivered by July 2021 (Dominguez, 
2020). 
1. Requirements Process 
Most requirements documents of the Tuo Chiang–class corvette program are still 
classified; thus, it is difficult to get the details of its requirements process. However, the 
development of the corvette’s concept can be understood by tracing back through Taiwan’s 
national defense strategies and threats over recent years.  
In Taiwan’s 2009 QDR, the MND indicated that the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) had never given up occupying Taiwan with military force, and it had been 
developing its advanced aircrafts, submarines, amphibious operation capabilities, and even 
aircraft carriers, posing significant defense threats to Taiwan (MND, Taiwan, 2009b). In 
the face of the PRC’s growing military capability and the increasing asymmetry of military 
scale between China and Taiwan, the national defense strategy of Taiwan has changed 
significantly over time (see Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17. Taiwan Defense Strategy Evolution Since 1949. Source: 
MND, Taiwan (2019). 
Under the national strategic trend from offensive posture to defensive stance, the 
MND incorporated several essentials in the 2009 National Defense Report regarding the 
Navy’s strategic concepts and force buildup plan (MND, Taiwan, 2009a), including  
• an indigenously developed system to enhance self-reliant defense 
capability and domestic shipbuilding industry;  
• the establishment of capabilities for a three-dimension strike; 
• a missile-oriented weapon system; and 
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• a strike force that is elite, highly efficient, rapidly deployable, and 
capable of performing long-range strikes. 
Despite the difficulty of obtaining the detailed requirements development process, 
many characteristics of the Tuo Chiang–class corvette reflect these early strategic concepts, 
including smaller size (compared to Taiwan’s other missile frigates), agility, a powerful 
missile weapon system, and—most importantly—indigenous development. 
2. Resource Allocation Process 
According to local media, the Taiwan Navy started the “Navy High-performance 
Ship” (code: “Hsun Hai [Swift Sea]”) program in 2009, the goal of which was to build 12 
to 16 littoral missile corvettes in future years (Guang, 2009). The program was originally 
planned to be included in the 2011–2015 FYAP. However, in 2010, the minutes of a 
meeting between the MND and the Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Defense 
indicated that and the program was postponed to FY2012 due to some issues encountered 
in the programming process (Legislative Yuan, Taiwan, 2010). The budgetary proposal 
totaling approximately NT$2.14 billion (US$71.4 million) was distributed into FY2012 to 
2015 AAP (MND, Taiwan, 2012a).  
After the T&E for the operational performance of the prototype ship (ROCS Tuo 
Chiang), which was delivered in 2015, the Taiwan Navy upgraded some of its design, 
including size, length, width, number of crew members, and weapon systems (Defense 
World, 2017). The Navy planned to build 11 upgraded version ships, which was originally 
divided into three batches with three, four, and four ships, respectively. The required 
budget, totaling NT$14.434 billion (US$471.68 million) for the first batch, was included 
in the MND’s FY2017 budgetary proposal and distributed in FY2017 to FY2025 (Lo & 
Hetherington, 2017). 
In 2018, the Navy proposed a budget increase for the construction of the first batch 
of ships by 13.63%, to a total of NT$16.4205 billion (US$547.205 million), causing some 
legislators doubts over the program’s cost analysis procedure (Up Media, 2018b). The 
Navy replied in response to the issue that the increased cost was caused mainly by the 
additional anti-aircraft missile system. Under the direction of President Tsai Ing-wen in 
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2020 against the growing threats from China, the Navy intended to increase the quantity 
and expedite the production of the first batch of ships to six ships before 2023 with the total 
quantity of ships to be built remain unchanged (Van Trieste, 2020). While the budgetary 
proposal for FY2021 remains the same, the dynamic change of the production rate is likely 
to increase the budget request for the program in coming years. 
3. Acquisition Process 
According to the Government e-Procurement System of Taiwan’s Public 
Construction Committee, the Navy started a public solicitation for the preparation for the 
reference material of the high-performance ship construction in March 2008. Shiu (2018) 
noted that the Hsun Hai program’s preliminary design and contract design were also 
completed in 2008, after the Navy Shipbuilding and Development Center finished the 
feasibility analysis and concept design (Navy Command R.O.C., n.d.-c). However, no 
record on the Government e-Procurement System indicates that the contract for preliminary 
design and contract design were awarded that year. With the Legislative Yuan’s approval 
for the Hsun Hai program in the MND’s 2012 AAP, the MND’s Armament Bureau issued 
a solicitation for building the prototype of the high-performance ships in 2011, which was 
eventually awarded to the LungTeh Shipbuilding Company in April 2012 (Lo, 2012). 
Meanwhile, the NCSIST was appointed to initiate the development of the corvette’s 
weapon system. It is also worth mentioning that in the same year, the Navy issued another 
solicitation for the contract design and technical consultant service for the program, which 
was awarded to the Ship and Ocean Industries R&D Center in November, 7 months after 
the construction contract was awarded.  
The prototype ship, later named Tuo Chiang (PGG-618), was delivered to the Navy 
in 2014, equipped with Taiwan’s indigenous designed “Hsun Lian” combat system and 
“Hsiung Feng Ⅲ” supersonic anti-ship missile launcher developed by the NCSIST 
(LaGrone, 2014), marking the entrance to the program’s T&E phase. As the Navy 
discovered several issues regarding the prototype ship’s operational capabilities, including 
overweight weapon system, stability, and lack of air defense capability, the design of 
follow-up ships was adjusted with larger size and anti-aircraft missiles (Lo & Hetherington, 
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2017). In 2017, the Navy announced the “Cheng Hai” program to produce follow-up ships 
in three batches, the first batch of which contained three ships planned to be delivered by 
2025 (GlobalSecurity, n.d.). The Navy originally planned to build the three ships of the 
first batch in the anti-aircraft configuration, one of the two variants the Navy designed with 
emphases on anti-surface and air defense capabilities respectively (Trevithick, 2018). The 
development of the weapon system and the solicitation for the ship hulls of the first batch 
of ships was commissioned to NCSIST in August 2018, with a budget increase from 
NT$14.4 billion to NT$16.1 billion (Lo, 2018). One of the reasons for the budget growth 
was the transformation of the MND’s acquisition process in 2016, in which the head 
governor for managing the solicitation and contracting of any program related to the 
NCSIST was changed from the MND’s Armaments Bureau to the NCSIST itself (Up 
Media, 2018a). The NCSIST was transformed from a government agency to an 
administrative corporation in 2015, as it could allow the NCSIST to adopt more flexible 
acquisition or contract strategies than government agencies could since the latter were 
limited by the government regulations (Li, 2014). In this case, the Navy adopted the lowest 
tender to select the contractor for the prototype ship, thus the bidders had to compete with 
one another in terms of price. In contrast, the NCSIST adopted the most advantageous 
tender for the follow-up ships, enabling the contractors to emphasize performance with 
tolerably higher cost. 
A legislator from the Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Defense told the 
media in November 2018 that the follow-up ships would remove the anti-submarine 
capabilities and that the Navy canceled the plan to build the ships in two variant designs 
(Hung, 2018). All 11 ships would be built in the same design with the emphasis on anti-
surface and air defense capability. Furthermore, to expedite the production plan, in which 
all ships were scheduled to be completed by 2036, the Navy claimed that the ships would 
be built in only two batches instead of the original three, and all ships were expected to be 
completed by 2026. In 2020, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, announced after the launch 
ceremony of the first upgraded version of corvettes, ROCS Ta Chiang, that the production 
of the first batch of six ships would be sped up and completed by 2023 (Van Trieste, 2020).  
44 
C. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
By analyzing the processes, the two programs of the United States and Taiwan, the 
different approaches the two countries used are identified. These different approaches, 
instead of the differences in the systems themselves, might be the main causes of the 
programs’ eventual success of failure. More detailed discussions of the two programs are 
as follows: 
1. U.S. Littoral Combat Ship 
In a testimony by the GAO, Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate (2016), the LCS 
program reportedly failed to meet expected goals in all cost, schedule, and capability areas 
(see Table 2). The GAO also identified several reasons for the program’s failure, including 
the emphasis on quantity instead of capability, the experimental approach of the program’s 
acquisition strategy, and the lack of T&E before production. Work (2014) stated in his 
research that one of the reasons the Navy started to develop the concept of LCSs, an 
affordable warship operating in littoral areas, was to form the Navy force with the desired 
number of surface ships. Furthermore, the experimental approach, to build two design 
variants and mission packages fitting in both variants separately, requires more time to test 
and compare the prototypes, integrate the hulls and the packages, and evaluate their 
performance to ensure that the desired capability is delivered. However, as the GAO stated 
in the report, the Navy made “major commitments to build large numbers of ships before 
proving their capabilities” (Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate, 2016, p. 4). As a result, the 
construction was initiated without “ensuring the maturity of technologies, requirements, 
and design” (p. 4). One of the evidences for the Navy’s disregard of the capabilities is that 
the first ship was approved for construction before the CDD was completed. 
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Table 2. Evolution of Expectations for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Program. Source: Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate (2016). 
 Early Program Updated Program 
Quantity 
and Cost 
55 seaframes @ $220 million each 40 seaframes @ $478 million each 
Schedule Ship IOC in 2007 Ship IOC with partial capability in 
2013 
Design Leverage existing designs for 
reduced cost, rapid fielding 
Considerable design changes, under 
revision throughout early construction 
Seaframe Sprint speed: 40–50 knots; range: 
1,000 nautical miles @ 40 knots 
Neither seaframe meets combined 
original speed and range expectations 
Mission 
Packages 
IOC for three mission packages by 
2010 
Revised IOC: one package in 2015, 
two more planned by 2020 
Crewing LCS would be minimally manned 
(55–60 crew) 
Crew size has increased over time to 70 
 
Not surprisingly, subsequent issues occurred with the Navy’s “quantity first” 
approach. The Navy’s original plan was to build four prototype ships and down-select to 
one of the two designs after testing and comparing their operational capabilities. However, 
the GAO (2017) noted that “this decision supports an aggressive testing schedule between 
fiscal years 2017 and 2022” (p. 10). Subsequently, insufficient timely testing caused 
deficiencies in follow-up ships, leading to higher cost for design modification. Moreover, 
higher cost brings obstacles for the program’s approval in Congress. The budget cap was 
set and later lifted by Congress, and the Navy had to postpone the program several times 
to find ways to lower the cost. In addition, lack of T&E also affected the LCSs’ capability. 
In the same report, the GAO identified that capability changes were inevitable due to more 
and more testing and operational experiments, and the Navy had to modify its original 
requirements for the LCS and reconsider how the LCS could be operated in the fleet. 
In summary, the Navy’s decision to deviate the LCS program’s acquisition strategy 
from traditional processes might, judging by the results, not be a successful approach. To 
pursue the quantity of ships in an efficient way, the Navy abandoned the process regulated 
in the DOD- and Navy-specified instructions by focusing more on quantity over capability, 
by constructing the ships before conducting proper requirement identification processes, 
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and by leaving insufficient time for T&E. As a result, the Navy failed in delivering the 
capability, controlling the budget, and managing the schedule. 
2. Taiwan Tuo Chiang–Class Corvette 
Taiwan’s Tuo Chiang–class corvette program is only in the middle of the 
acquisition process, so it is uncertain whether it will eventually be a successful program. 
However, the decisions the Taiwan Navy has made can be analyzed to assess the program’s 
performance. First, defense industries in Taiwan are not as mature as they are in the United 
States. Taiwan’s MND and Navy have to take over the preliminary design and weapon 
system development work instead of authorizing them to civilian contractors. As a result, 
the programs are more manageable since the Navy controls more of the program’s progress. 
In addition, the Taiwan Navy only needs to choose the contractors by their capability, 
proposed budget, and past performance, whereas the U.S. Navy has to select from two 
fundamentally different variants, which requires a lot more effort and time.  
Second, the T&E works were more sufficient for the Tuo Chiang corvette’s 
production. The prototype ship, ROCS Tuo Chiang, was deployed in 2015, and the Navy 
did not start the production of the first batch of upgraded version ships until the operational 
evaluation of the prototype ship was fully done in 2019. Furthermore, according to Chu 
(2018b), the Committee of Foreign Affairs and National Defense of the Legislative Yuan 
once doubted that the follow-up ships might encounter issues with the design changes after 
the T&E of the prototype. The Navy promised in response that all other ships of the first 
batch would not be constructed until after the first ship (ROCS Ta Chiang) was delivered 
and fully tested. Finally, the Taiwan Navy did not sacrifice the ships’ core capability 
requirements in exchange for larger quantity or faster production rate. In fact, the Navy 
even enhanced the ships’ anti-surface and air defense capability after the T&E of the 
prototype ship. Table 3 shows the changes in design of the prototype and upgraded ships. 
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Table 3. Design Changes of ROCS Ta Chiang 
 ROCS Tuo Chiang ROCS Ta Chiang 
Length  60.4 m 65 m 
Width 14 m 14.8 m 
Height 2.4 m 2.1 m 
Displacement 600 ton 685 ton 
Capabilities Short-range air defense 
Anti-surface 
Anti-submarine 




However, there are some concerns regarding the program despite the fact that fewer 
mistakes were identified so far in this program when compared to the U.S. LCS program. 
First, Taiwan’s president announced in 2021 that the production of the ships will be 
increased and expedited, from three ships in 6 years to six ships in 3 years. Such a 
significant change in schedule, despite the contractor’s confidence in achieving the goal, 
will challenge the Navy’s ability to conduct a timely T&E process. Second, the NCSIST 
plays a more important role in the acquisition system after the MND’s modification of the 
acquisition process. The solicitation of the upgraded version ships, for example, was 
conducted and awarded by the NCSIST. While the approach might allow more flexible 
contract strategies, it also brings inconsistency among other MND-managed programs. In 
this case, some legislators doubted the increased cost, which was partly caused by the 
NCSIST’s contracting strategy. Finally, the program is expected to deliver its IOC by 2023, 
when the first batch of ships will be deployed. It will be 14 years after the program was 
initiated even with the President’s order to expedite it. However, the requirements of a 
program is generated from the 10-Year Force Buildup Plan, which covers the threats in the 
future 10 years, which is not long enough to cover the schedule of a complex program such 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research is to compare and contrast the acquisition systems of 
the United States and Taiwan by analyzing two Navy shipbuilding programs in order to 
identify the pros and cons of the two systems and to provide recommendations for 
improvements. This chapter contains an analysis of the U.S. LCS program and Taiwan’s 
Tuo Chiang–class corvette program and offers conclusions and recommendations.  
A. CONCLUSION 
The United States and Taiwan establish similar structures of the acquisition system, 
however, the U.S. acquisition system is overall more complete and systemic than Taiwan’s 
system. As for the implementation, the U.S. Navy made several mistakes caused by the 
experimental acquisition strategy in the process of the LCS program, whereas Taiwan 
adopted a more conventional approach for the Tuo Chiang-class corvette program hence 
mitigated the risk.  
1. The U.S. Acquisition System 
The United States has more complete, thorough, and detailed regulations to govern 
the three systems of the big “A” acquisition framework. All the regulations interact with 
each other and cover the whole acquisition process all the way to the end of a product’s 
life cycle. Different pathways are set for different types of programs to better manage each 
program. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy specifies a regulation to govern shipbuilding 
programs considering their complexity and required time. However, the experimental 
approach of the LCS program, the emphasis on quantity of ships instead of capability, and 
the disregard of T&E made the program fail in capability, cost, and schedule.  
2. Taiwan Acquisition System  
Taiwan imported many concepts and methodologies of acquisition from the United 
States,\; hence, many similarities can be found in Taiwan’s acquisition processes. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan’s acquisition regulations do not cover the process after the execution 
of a program, and the process descriptions are not as detailed as the U.S. regulations. The 
50 
requirements system, for example, is only briefly mentioned in the same regulation 
governing the acquisition process. As to shipbuilding programs, the Navy does specify a 
special pathway for the R&D phase of the process. However, the more detailed descriptions 
for each activity are not obtainable to the public. The Taiwan Navy took a more 
conventional and safer approach in the Tuo Chiang corvette program, with the main focus 
on the capability and sufficient time for adequate T&E procedures. In addition, the fact that 
Taiwan lacks a mature defense industry in nature makes it necessary for the MND and 
Navy to take over the R&D of the corvette’s concept, which leads to a more manageable 
schedule for the Navy. Despite the Tuo Chiang corvette program being in the middle of the 
process, the Taiwan Navy has avoided some major mistakes that the U.S. Navy made in 
the LCS program. However, concerns such as the significant expediting of the production 
rate and the more important role that the NCSIST plays in the newly reformed acquisition 
process might endanger the program in the future. Additionally, the 10-Year Force Buildup 
Plan, which is used to identify threats and requirements, cannot cover the schedule of 
longer programs, such as shipbuilding programs. 
B. IMPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this research indicate that the U.S. acquisition processes are more 
complete, providing more guidance overall in details of the processes in all phases and in 
all kinds of programs, whereas Taiwan’s acquisition system needs integration and 
supplements to cover the life cycle of a product. However, the two discussed programs 
reveal shortages of the acquisition systems of both countries in a practical manner. 
Although the United States’ acquisition system has a more complete structure, the U.S. 
Navy failed in every dimension to achieve the LCS program’s original goals, mostly 
because of the experimental approach the Navy took. On the other hand, Taiwan adopted 
a more conventional way to execute the Tuo Chiang–class corvette program with less risk. 
The program seems to be better under control compared to the U.S. LCS program; however, 
the recent aggressive expediting plan, if no further supporting measures are made, might 
bring higher risk to the program in the future. The following questions should be considered 
for both countries to improve their acquisition processes and strategies. 
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1. The U.S. Navy should conduct more thorough risk assessment and 
feasibility analysis before taking experimental acquisition strategies, 
which deviates from the conventional process. Otherwise, the milestones 
and gates regulated in the DOD and Navy instructions should be followed 
to ensure that all requirements are met before entering the next phase. The 
price the Navy has to pay to modify the design, capability, or schedule of a 
program might be enormous after the ships are being constructed.  
2. The United States should focus on capability over other targets. As the 
DOD’s 2001 QDR directed, the defense strategy has shifted to a 
capability-based approach. An acquisition program’s ultimate goal is to 
transform resources to desired capabilities, and its success should be 
judged mainly by the capabilities it forms. With the capability-based 
mindset, the officers can understand what to prioritize at decision points of 
inevitable compromise. 
3. The U.S. Navy should take T&E processes seriously, especially in the 
shipbuilding process. There must be enough time frame for sufficient 
operational T&E before any decision of construction. The price of time 
and cost would be much higher if design or requirement changes occurred 
after the ships are built. Timely T&E might slow down the process in the 
beginning but could definitely lower the risk for the whole program. 
4. The Taiwan Navy should establish a more complete acquisition guidance 
system that covers all processes from the birth of the idea to the disposal 
of the product. In addition, the regulations should also include the 
instructions and guidance regarding how the NCSIST interacts with the 
MND in terms of their responsibilities in the defense acquisition structure. 
Although such guidance might exist in relevant MND components that are 
not obtainable to the public, the fact that they are not integrated in a 
system makes it more difficult for the officers to review and follow. 
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5. The Taiwan Navy should not ignore the importance of T&E in pursuing 
the expediting of the Tuo Chiang–class corvette program. Despite the 
prototype being properly tested and evaluated for design improvements, 
the first ship of the upgraded version is just about to be delivered. New 
operational T&E must be fully conducted before the construction of the 
follow-up ships to avoid the lessons learned from the U.S. LCS program, 
which is the failure in capability, schedule, and time due to insufficient 
T&E. 
6. Taiwan needs to develop strategic guidance that covers the prediction of 
threats and capability gaps for more years to come. The current highest 
strategic guidance, the 10-Year Force Buildup Plan, can cover the 
analytical basis for requirements identification in only a future decade, 
which is often not sufficient for a shipbuilding program to be thoroughly 
executed. Such recommended guidance can not only provide better 
direction to generate requirements for the targeted years but also bring 
forward a program’s early process, provide more schedule flexibility for a 
program to be completed in time, and further reduce the possible need for 
expediting the process in the future with the derivative risk. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research is limited in time and scale and only compares the acquisition 
processes, especially shipbuilding processes, of the United States and Taiwan. Moreover, 
some resources are not accessible due to classification, and two discussed programs are not 
currently finished. Some possible future research relating to this topic includes: 
1. Analyzing acquisition programs other than shipbuilding programs. Every 
service might have its own unique pathways to govern the acquisition 
process, and the issues and problems along the way might be different 
from Navy shipbuilding programs. 
2. Comparing and contrasting acquisition processes of other countries. 
Different countries might have different structures, focus on different 
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aspects, or even adopt different philosophies to manage their acquisition 
process. It is always beneficial to learn as many different approaches as 
possible to come up with possible improvements to current systems. 
3. Studying the two discussed programs in the future after the products are 
all produced, deployed, and operated. This research can only analyze the 
two programs under current progress; however, a thorough understanding 
of a program’s success or failure can only be learned at its end when all 
the outcomes can be taken into consideration.  
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